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SUMMARY
Conservation trading has developed as a policy instru-
ment for biodiversity protection. This paper traces the
emergence, development, and spread of conservation
trading, focusing particularly on the formation and
activities of an increasingly transnational policy
instrument constituency, namely the actor group
that has formed around the policy instrument in its
support. The development of conservation trading was
predominantly guided by a constituency of dominant
business-oriented actors, beginning with mitigation
measures in the USA and making later connections
to international networks with a similar market-
driven orientation for environmental protection. By
strategically combining agenda-driven research with
the mobilization of political support, this constituency
helped to establish conservation trading as a widely
acknowledged policy solution applicable to various
ecological and sociopolitical contexts. Yet, this was
achieved, in part, at the cost of neglecting critical
issues, such as the recognition of policy alternatives
or socioecological or cultural context particularities.
Whereas the development of conservation trading
is sometimes portrayed as a rational process of
neutral policy learning, this process, through its
constituency, has developed a life and political
momentum of its own, which must be acknowledged
when engaging with the design and implementation of
better conservation policies. A forward-looking social
policy assessment approach is required, which opens
up policy design discourses for debate and reflexive
engagement. Acknowledging possible shortcomings
with a broad range of concerned societal actors can
help to assure policy transparency, add specificity, and
increase the sound ecological and societal embedding
of conservation trading.
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INTRODUCTION
In response to increasing land-use pressures and continuous
loss of biodiversity, biodiversity offsets have been developed
as a new policy solution for regulating the compensation
for impacts on biological diversity (ten Kate et al. 2004).
While impacts and offsets are intended to be functionally
and spatially equivalent, possibilities to disconnect, aggregate
and trade with offsets, using pooling and banking models,
have grown in importance in policy practice. Governments
around the world consider, plan, or have already implemented
conservation trading schemes, also known as mitigation,
species, habitat or biodiversity banking and trading, as a
means to address the problem of biodiversity loss. At their
core, conservation trading schemes allow for the compensation
of impacts in one place with conservation or restoration
measures in other places, if stricter mitigation measures, such
as avoidance or reduction, are not feasible (ten Kate et al.
2004). Compensation can happen on a case-by-case basis,
by offsetting the impacts of specific development projects
through additional protection measures at a different site
(Wheeler & Strock 1995). Alternatively, compensation may
take the form of standardized banking procedures, of issuing
generic biodiversity credits for protection measures, which
can be produced in advance and independently of concrete
impacts, and later used to compensate biodiversity losses
created by other projects (Fox & Nino-Murcia 2005; Mead
2008). This latter form can be linked to regulations that
provide for private conservation banks, which generate and
offer credits on a commercial basis (Bauer et al. 2004).
The creation of conservation trading schemes is regarded as
an innovative form of governance for biodiversity protection,
which may complete or even substitute for direct interventions
by the state (Haddad 1997; Jordan et al. 2003, 2005;
TEEB [The Economics and Ecosystems and Biodiversity
Initiative] 2008; Tommel & Verdun 2008). Such schemes
may reduce regulatory costs, dampen the adversarial nature
of regulation and support economic growth, while still
achieving regulatory and conservation goals (Mead 2008).
In contrast to such high expectations, empirical assessments
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of existing conservation markets have produced mixed
results (Wilcove & Lee 2004; Fox & Nino-Murcia 2005),
and critics have warned that conservation trading, along
with the resulting commodification of nature, tends to
endanger environmental protection rather than promoting it
(see for example Robertson 2004, 2006; Sullivan 2012). A
problem in assessing the performance of conservation trading
schemes seems to be a lack of data on trade volumes and
environmental effectiveness (Wilcove & Lee 2004; Madsen
et al. 2011). Beyond this problem, the question whether or not
conservation trading is effective or preferable also depends on
the ideological and epistemic standpoint. Empirical political
science research on policy instrumentation has shown that
policy instruments are bearers of values rather than neutral
tools; their design and choice are often a matter of fierce
ideological conflict (Peters & Van Nispen 1998; Eliadis et al.
2005; Lascoumes & LeGales 2007; Voß and Simons 2014).
Given the controversial status of conservation trading, the
success of this instrument in terms of international diffusion
is puzzling. Thus, from a political science perspective on
conservation trading systems, a series of questions become
relevant, which have so far been neglected in the conservation
policy discourse and which we aim to address in this paper.
While a major focus has been on the design, implementation
and performance of conservation trading, there is a research
gap concerning the promotion of this instrument in academia,
the private sector and politics (Wolff et al. 2015).
We aim to shed more light on the innovation process of
conservation trading systems and to answer the following
questions: Why and how has conservation trading acquired
its current status as a promising policy instrument despite
concerns about its ecological effectiveness? Who promotes
conservation trading, for which aims, and by which means?
What connects the design and implementation processes of
conservation trading schemes in different countries and what
are the effects of such connections? Our strategy in supporting
the search for and innovation of better conservation policies
is thus not to study the effectiveness or cost-efficiency of
conservation trading narrowly but add to the discourse on the
political dynamics that lead to the diffusion of this instrument
and its perception as a promising new policy solution.
We review the theoretical literature on policy instruments
and policy ideas, introduce the notion of a policy instrument
constituency as a network of actors that forms around the
support of a new or given policy solution, and outline our
methodological approach. We applied this approach to a
case study on the emergence and growth of the conservation
trading constituency and their influence on the development
of conservation trading as a new policy instrument. The
case of conservation trading seems particularly suitable for
studying policy innovation processes, as it demonstrates
the vast and ongoing development of a policy instrument
that became recognised in the international conservation
policy discourse. Starting from early ideas to compensate
for impacts on wetlands, which emerged in the practice of
handling mitigation requirements in the USA, we describe
the ‘innovation journey’ (Van de Ven et al. 1999) of
conservation trading, namely its development history via
institutionalization processes on the regional and federal level
until its establishment as a recognized policy solution on a
global level. A particular focus will be on the involved actors
and their activities leading towards the recognition of trading
systems for biodiversity conservation on regional, national,
and international policy agendas, as well as on the ongoing
negotiation processes concerning the design and application
of conservation trading schemes. Our aim was to highlight the
social dynamics of policy innovation processes, captured in the
notion of instrument constituencies, as well as the associated
problems, and to identify trends toward the commodification
of nature and ‘expertization’ (where only experts are deemed
suitable to assess policy) of environmental policymaking.
THEORY ANDMETHODS
Our theoretical orientation is based on the assumption that
differing and in parts conflicting visions exist about how to
deal with policy problems, here in the loss of biodiversity.
While the political process often becomes conceptualized as a
matter of rational problem solving, where policy instruments
are chosen from an available pool of instruments on the
basis of their efficiency and effectiveness, we reviewed three
strands of political sciences literature that complemented each
other in producing an alternative view on policy change and
instruments.
The first strand consists of policy change theories that
highlight the role of policy ideas in the policy process;
so-called ideational approaches. According to the advocacy
coalition framework (ACF) of Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith
(1993), policy change is explained as the struggle between
advocacy coalitions. Since advocacy coalitions differ with
regards to their belief systems, they have different perceptions
of the political situation and thus pursue different goals and
strategies. Consequently, the choice of policy instruments
is explained as following directly from the beliefs of
policymakers, who choose them as means to realize their
objectives, given their belief systems (Braun & Capano 2010).
Hall’s (1993) policy paradigm approach is another prominent
ideational approach and similar to the ACF. Policy paradigms
are in essence what are called belief systems in the ACF. They
serve to specify policy problems and goals. Hall (1993) argued
that policy instruments were much easier to change, on the
basis of social learning, than other aspects of policy paradigms.
In fact, the change of policy instruments according to changing
perceptions amounts to ‘normal policy making’, namely a
process that adjusts policy without challenging the overall
terms of a given policy paradigm (Hall 1993, p. 279). A third
approach is that of discourse coalitions (Hajer 1993; Bulkeley
2000), a concept rooted in the assumption that policymaking
is not only a struggle of ideas and diverging meanings, but
first of all a process of making meaning. In this view, policy
beliefs do not fall from the sky nor are they determined by
exogenous interests, as both the ACF and Hall’s paradigm
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approach might suggest, but they are constantly renegotiated
in social practices, which give meaning to physical and social
realities. Policy instruments are then supported or opposed
on the basis of the meaning they have for different actors.
Discourse coalitions are groups of actors that form around
shared concepts and story lines and try to impose their view
of the reality on others (Hajer 1993). Discourse coalitions are
much more transient than advocacy coalitions or paradigm
schools. Their members do not necessarily need to share deep
core beliefs and they may jump from one discourse coalition
to another more easily. Discourse and discourse coalitions are
thus more open concepts (Braun & Capano 2010).
Whereas ideational theories of policy change tend to treat
policy instrumentation as a side issue, and are in this regard
insufficient to explain the making of policy instruments,
a second relevant strand of literature specifically focuses
on policy instruments (Linder & Peters 1998; Hood 2007;
Lascoumes & LeGales 2007; Voß 2007; Voß & Simons 2014).
In this policy instrument literature there is a general, if often
implicit, agreement that instrument choice is a deeply political
process (Peters & Van Nispen 1998; Salamon 2002; Eliadis
et al. 2005; Lascoumes & LeGales 2007). It is assumed,
for example, that actors often negotiate policy strategies and
instruments as a matter of collective interests, positions, and
preferences. Going one step further, newer approaches see
policy instruments as social institutions capable of structuring
policy-making according to their own logic (Lascoumes &
LeGales 2007; Wolff et al. 2015). It has also been reasoned
that, just as instruments can follow ideas, ideas can also follow
instruments (Schneider & Sidney 2009: Braun & Capano
2010). This is because instruments as social institutions bear
values, influenced by a specific interpretation of the social and
of the mode of regulation involved (Lascoumes & LeGales
2007, p. 4).
A number of authors have further emphasized that the
diffusion of policy instruments cannot be explained through
political demand alone; the active promotion of instruments
by specific actor groups must also be acknowledged (Stone
2004; Voß 2007; Peck & Theodore 2010; Voß & Simons 2014;
Simons & Voß 2015). This is to say that the development and
spread of policy instruments is driven both by demand and
supply side dynamics (Voß 2007; Voß & Simons 2014). To
give an example, the development and spread of emissions
trading has coincided and was effected by the growth of
an emissions trading constituency, namely an actor group
that formed around the policy instrument, rather than a
particular policy problem (Voß & Simons 2014; Simons & Voß
2015). Through their constituencies, policy instruments gain
political momentum, because they are advocated from within.
Constituencies develop a reflexive interest in retaining and
expanding ‘their’ instrument and therefore engage in advocacy
activities.
Instrument constituencies do this by engaging in the
discursive construction (Keller 2011) of policy instruments
and the problems these instruments address. This process
also includes the institutionalization of this discourse, such
as its inscription into actual law. Part of the work of
instrument constituencies may consist in standardizing the
design of policy instruments to enable their wider application
(Simons et al. 2014). The general appeal of such generic
policy models remains the expectation of comparable results
(Peck & Theodore 2010). However, this one-size-fits-all
mentality behind policy innovation models seems especially
inappropriate in the case of conservation policy, where
blueprint approaches often fail to sufficiently embrace the
diversity of local settings and the complexity of ecosystems,
leading to unanticipated side-effects that may result in
poor natural resources management and environmental
degradation (Ostrom 2007, 2011; Galaz et al. 2008; Hagedorn
2008; Mann & Absher 2014).
We analysed two types of data. First, we examined
the existing (secondary) literature on the emergence and
development of conservation trading systems, including
literature on broader political trends, the policy instruments
involved in species conservation and impact mitigation, as
well as on related problems and issues. Second, we analysed
(primary) documents produced during the political processes
of creating conservation trading systems, such as statutes,
agency or think tank reports, position papers, protocols,
and scientific evaluations of instrument performance, with
the goal of identifying the emergence and strategic use
of arguments for or against the use of certain instrument
designs in a particular context. We further incorporated
a series of problem-centred expert interviews with actors
involved in advocating, criticizing, or setting up and operating
conservation trading systems. The results of these interviews
were published previously (Simons 2013a, b; Mann & Absher
2014).
RESULTS
The first ideas for conservation trading systems emerged
in the USA as an alternative mechanism to traditional
regulatory approaches for biodiversity protection and the
use of natural resources. In the mid-1970s, environmental
policy mainly consisted of command-and-control regulations,
especially for water, air, and species protection, regulated
under the Clean Water Act (CWA), the Clean Air Act
(CAA), and the Endangered Species Act (ESA), respectively
(Klyza & Sousa 2010). In response to a political mood shift
away from environmental concerns and toward economic
and energy security, the USA’s policy changed from strict
environmental regulations towards more flexible approaches
(Meidinger 1985; Dryzek et al. 2002). In this context,
the USA’s Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) started
experimenting with flexible regulations and mitigation
mechanisms. A mitigation hierarchy was developed as a
hierarchical sequence of steps for assessing development
projects, ranging from impact avoidance and minimization,
to the possibility of offsetting losses directly as the last option
(Hough & Robertson 2009).
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In practice, however, such mitigation activities, which
were mostly carried out as uncoordinated, small and spatially
disconnected case-by-case compensation, proved difficult. As
an innovative alternative inspired by the EPA’s experiences
with emission trading, the possibility to ‘bank’ either wetlands
(referred to as wetland banking) or species habitat (referred
to as conservation banking) for future use were introduced as
concepts where public-private partnerships appeared to offer
better flexibility in site selection and facilitate conservation
objectives. Banking is a particular case of mitigation action,
introducing a trading element for offset actions. From an
agency perspective, banking was seen as an opportunity to
add private land to the federal reserve system by enrolling
private actors (Soileau et al. 1984).
Institutionalization and emergence of a national
supporters’ base for conservation trading
In its original form, a mitigation bank is a parcel of privately or
publicly owned land that serves as a stock of wetland and/or
species habitat to offset habitat impacts elsewhere. In exchange
for managing land for species and habitat conservation or
restoration, the bank owner is granted ‘credits’ by the
responsible wildlife agency. These credits can then be traded
to parties who need to satisfy legal mitigation/compensation
requirements (Fox & Nino-Murcia 2005; Mead 2008).
Mitigation banking thus essentially operates as a free-market
enterprise allowing for the sale, purchase or trade of species
habitat, as represented by species credits. Once all of a bank’s
credits are sold, the land is managed as a preserve in perpetuity,
and financed by an endowment fund (US FWS [Fish and
Wildlife Service] 2009).
The first mitigation banks in the early 1980s under the
supervision of the US FWS were mainly established ad hoc
as non-commercial ventures of state agencies to satisfy their
own project compensation needs (Carroll et al. 2008; Hough
& Robertson 2009). At that time, commercial trading was still
an exception. The development towards third party provision
of banks began in the early 1990s (Hough & Robertson 2009).
This development was fostered by a series of reports resulting
from national wetland mitigation banking studies initiated by
the Corps Institute for Water Resources (Hough & Robertson
2009). In these reports, it was argued that an expansion of
wetland banking to a wider set of actors would yield ecological
and economic benefits.
Starting in 1995, federal and state mitigation banking
guidance and legislation were put in place to support
commercial wetland banking (Federal Guidance 1995). The
new regulations, although directed at wetland banking, also
gave state agencies, local governments, and the private sector
the procedural and conceptual guidance for conservation
banking under the legal requirements of the ESA of 1973. As a
result, a specialized conservation trading ‘industry’, essentially
a private credit market, started to develop, bundling and
combining expertise in environmental restoration, finance,
law, real estate, construction, and local market conditions.
In 1995, the California Resource Agency and the California
Environmental Protection Agency jointly released the ‘Official
Policy on Conservation Banks’ (Wheeler & Strock 1995). The
same year, the first conservation bank, ‘Carlsbad Highlands,’
was created after the model of wetland mitigation banks. In
1996, the FWS issued the first formal ESA consultation,
promoting the use of conservation banks. Other sectors like
transportation followed to include banking as a mitigation
option in their policies and procedures, as outlined in the
ESA.
However, even though official policy guidance was in
place, the implementation practice of mitigation banking
differed widely, as federal and state natural resource agencies
observed (see Fox & Nino-Murcia 2005; Mann & Absher
2014). Only a few banks were strictly modelled after the
policies, with most banks being established under individual
agreements between agencies and bank sponsors, with very
little exchange of information or coordination (ten Kate
et al. 2004). Actors involved in mitigation banking had
very different interests, some of which stood in the way
of achieving the policy’s goal of protecting endangered
species and their habitats (Mann & Absher 2014). Whereas
the agencies were concerned about the sound institutional
embedding of conservation banking into larger structures of
conservation networks, as well as about directing banks to
ecologically valuable sites, business-oriented actors selected
bank sites for criteria of profit maximization. Such different
rationales for bank establishment were leading to manifold
trade-offs in bank establishment and permitting processes.
Attempting to streamline banking processes, the US FWS
(2003) defines mitigation requirements under the ESA, insti-
tutionalizing conservation banking at the federal level in the
USA.
After the institutionalization and official promotion of
banking as a (last) mitigation option, commercial banking
took off. According to an Environmental Law Institute (ELI
2002) report, entrepreneurial mitigation banking became a
mainstream option for the loss of wetlands as well as for
habitat of endangered species after its institutionalization.
Such policy initiatives played an important role for the
dissemination of the idea of conservation credit trading, but
not alone. The USA has created an environment where
entrepreneurs can create and sell environmental services for
profit.
The formation of an international conservation
trading constituency
The institutionalization processes were closely linked to the
formation of a strong national supporter base. Debates about
incentive measures for biodiversity conservation created an
atmosphere of excitement in the business sector. While many
industry and business actors felt threatened by the prospect
of new regulations (Dunn 2002), others saw new business
opportunities. Analysts were predicting at the time that carbon
credits and allowances might become one of the world’s
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most valuable commodities, and there was a similar hope
that much could be earned with some sort of biodiversity
trading (Carroll et al. 2008; ten Kate et al. 2004; Madsen et al.
2010).
It soon became clear that the promotion of conservation
trading required the bundling of information and the exchange
of scattered experiences with wetland and conservation
banking approaches. As a response, in 1988, the EPA
initiated a new annual National Mitigation and Conservation
Banking Conference with the goal to foster exchange among
involved actors and organize scientific input. The same
year, the National Mitigation Banking Association (NMBA)
was founded to support and improve mitigation banking
legislation. It represents bankers and service providers,
engages in lobbying activities, and organizes conferences and
training courses for its members.
On the international level, support for ecosystem service
commodification increased during the 1990s (Robertson
2004). Between 1996 and 1998, representatives from
the forestry industry, environmental groups, finance, and
community conservation set up a USA think tank named
Forest Trends (FT), which became a leading advocate
of conservation trading and other environmental markets,
functioning as a matchmaker for bringing together diverse
experts with potential financiers (Daily & Ellison 2003). Such
efforts by FT and others led to the formation of a strong,
transnational and explicitly business-oriented constituency for
biodiversity trading.
In 2001, a group of oil and gas companies teamed up with
environmental groups and think tanks including Fauna and
Flora International, the International Union for Conservation
of Nature (IUCN), and The Nature Conservancy (TNC)
to form the Energy and Biodiversity Initiative, which stated
that voluntary or required biodiversity offsets ‘should be the
minimum expected standard by which all companies operate’
(The Energy & Biodiversity Initiative 2003, p. 47). Others
highlighted the ‘business case’ of potential credit banking
(Eftec et al. 2010) or biodiversity offsets (ten Kate et al. 2004)
and communicated these ideas, among other things, to the
Katoomba Group, the IUCN’s Global Biodiversity Forum,
and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD; see Insight
Investment 2004).
In 2004, the Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme
(BBOP) emerged as another key driver of transnational
dealing with biodiversity trading. It was set up by
FT and Conservation International, and quickly enrolled
over 50 companies, financial institutions, governments and
civil society organizations focusing on the question of
compensation for impacts on biological diversity. BBOP
produces guidance for the design of biodiversity offsets
(Crowe & ten Kate 2010), supports pilot projects and
disseminates best practice models (BBOP 2004) around
the world, and has become a widely recognized venue
of international exchange (Darbi et al. 2009). As such,
specialized networks like FT, ELI and BBOP function as
policy entrepreneurs. They are subsuming diverse actors and
interests, thus bundling efforts for pushing ‘their’ policy
solution on the international political agenda.
International agenda setting
Today, conservation trading schemes are developed and
discussed in many places around the world. Such efforts
are actively promoted and coordinated by a growing
transnational instrument constituency, seeking to streamline
the development of such schemes by organizing the exchange
of practical experience and by promoting dialogue between
policymakers, industry and the conservation community (ten
Kate et al. 2004). Constituency actors coordinate information
and work on the establishment of best practice standards.
Conservation trading became the common umbrella label for
existing and planned banking and credit-trading schemes,
which were now predominantly discussed as specific
applications of the economic theory of tradable permits (see
ten Kate et al. 2004; Carroll et al. 2008; Madsen et al. 2010;
Simons et al. 2014).
In recent years, BBOP linked up with Ecosystem
Marketplace (EM), FT’s online platform for constituency
exchange and information on carbon, water, and biodiversity
markets. As such the discourse on conservation trading also
became influenced by the development of emission trading
under the Kyoto Protocol. The rationale of launching EM
was to stimulate market creation for environmental policy
through information services that help a clear understanding
of the policy changes that drive these markets, as well as the
science that underpins them (Ecosystem Marketplace 2010).
As an outcome of the activities of these policy
entrepreneurs, market-based instruments (MBI) are high on
the agenda of many policy initiatives at the national and
also at the international level. The Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment identified a greater use of MBIs for the protection
of biodiversity and ecosystem services as a promising way
forward (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005, p. 21).
Within the CBD, a dedicated work programme started
exploring various MBIs for use in the context of biodiversity
protection (COP 10 2010). The Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) launched a Working
Group on the Economic Aspects of Biodiversity (WGEAB,
now known as the Working Party on Biodiversity, Water and
Ecosystems, WPBWE), leading to various events, reports and
handbooks on market creation and finance mechanisms for
biodiversity conservation (OECD 1999, 2013). Major support
for international conservation trading also came from the
The Economics and Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB)
Initiative (TEEB 2008, 2010). And, during the Rio +20
United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development
(USCSD) the Green Economy discourse was prominently
addressed (UNCSD 2012). These developments have been
creating great expectations for a new specialized conservation
trading industry, which views conservation trading as a
profitable business case.
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Conservation trading is increasingly embraced as a
potentially universal solution to nature conservation that
needs to be further refined and tested under different context
conditions. Recently, EM identified 45 existing compensatory
mitigation programmes around the world, the USA’s wetland
and species banking being the widest in scope (Madsen
et al. 2011). Together, the world’s biodiversity markets are
estimated to have a total value of at least US$ 2.4–4.0 billion
with  187 000 ha of land protected under the various
programmes (Madsen et al. 2011). To a great extent, this
is the achievement of the conservation trading constituency
such as FT, EM, ELI, BBOP and others who have influenced
agenda-setting processes on various levels of policymaking and
introduced relevant policy communities to concepts pertinent
to biodiversity conservation.
DISCUSSION
We described the growth of a policy instrument constituency
as the main driver of innovation of conservation trading
systems. What had started in the USA in the realm of wetland
and species protection policy, developed toward a promising
globally-recognized instrument for biodiversity conservation.
Its growing application at the international level has been
carried by a transnational network of dedicated experts
that coordinates information, makes connections between
like-minded discourses on environmental markets, and
largely manages the science-policy-industry interfaces. The
conservation trading constituency consists of heterogeneous
actors of different fields of expertise. Their engagement
is connected to particular and different interests in
developing and expanding conservation trading design and
implementation. For example, agencies see banking mainly as
a means to enlarge and better connect protected areas systems,
scientists deal with questions of defining the equivalence of
loss and compensation, and business actors have an interest in
establishing biodiversity markets and service infrastructures.
Together, all these actors have contributed to the development
and expansion of conservation trading systems on a global
scale. While constituency formation and specialization on
particular policy solutions in itself is not a bad thing (after
all this is a network of actors pushing for policy innovation),
we see two related problems with this dynamic.
First, there is a marketization trend in the discourse
on species and habitat protection, pushed by dominant
constituency actors who advocate a market-based version
of compensatory mitigation and offsets, such as commercial
banking. Pro-market governmental and non-governmental
organizations, coalitions and initiatives, such as the OECD,
the CBD, Forest Trends, IUCN, BBOP, or TEEB,
deliberately push for a shift in biodiversity protection toward
marketization of biodiversity credits. Such efforts are backed
up by a growing private conservation trading industry,
which is especially well developed in the USA context. The
problem with this marketization trend is that alternative policy
approaches, such as command-and-control regulations, land
purchase, protection contracts, or non-commercial forms of
banking, which may equally be able to tackle the problem of
biodiversity loss, become relegated to the background simply
because they do not have constituencies with similar lobbying
powers behind them. A market-based approach to biodiversity
protection promises business opportunities, such as providing
particular services and infrastructures, which attract powerful
corporate interests that may eventually outweigh non-
corporate interests in the protection of biodiversity. One
result was, for instance, that the established market structures
seemed to be insufficient for directing bank location to the
most ecologically valuable sites with only limited control of
the regulatory agencies (Mann & Absher 2014).
Closely linked to the marketization trend, we further sense
an ‘expertization trend’ (see Yearley 1994 and Eden 1998
on the empirical phenomenon of expertization). The policy
design discourse on conservation trading to a large degree
remains an expert discourse, taking place among constituency
actors and thereby being largely shielded off from public
debate. This can be problematic because decisions made in
expert circles also affect non-expert audiences, for example
private and public actors in implementation contexts. At the
same time, the expert discourse on conservation trading design
tends to push for a one-size-fits-all approach to compensatory
mitigation (such as standardized banking procedures; see
BBOP 2012), which runs the risk of neglecting context specific
specificities. The danger here is that the process of designing
and developing conservation trading becomes too decoupled
from the local ecological and social dynamics at the sites
of intended policy implementation and may fail to reach
intended policy objectives (Mann & Absher 2014). Both these
trends have to do with the fact that through its constituency,
conservation trading has developed a social life of its own.
Whereas policy choice is often understood as a process where
policymakers choose the most appropriate and effective tool
from a pool of equally available tools, our analysis shows that
all tools are not equal: some have a stronger constituency
behind them than others, thus exerting a stronger influence
on the process of policy choice. To the extent that instrument
constituencies lobby for particular instrument designs and
persuade policy communities to implement these designs, they
become political actors in their own right without necessarily
being transparent about their underlying values and interests.
As such, the specialization, expertization and influence
of instrument constituencies in policy design processes is
not inherently bad or inefficient, but seems also necessary
for dealing with particular socioecological interactions and
problems. However, we wish to stress that the current
promotion of an instrument should not be taken as an indicator
for the instrument’s actual efficiency or effectiveness, but
as a test of responsiveness to unresolved issues for future
nature-conservation policy. There still are serious challenges
to implementing conservation trading schemes that need to
be addressed. For example, the issue of complex and diverse
ecological conditions versus simple measurement units of
functional or spatial equivalence for trade, the reduction of
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biodiversity and ecosystems values to monetary terms, or their
general suitability for dealing with the loss of biodiversity
(Robertson 2006; Mann et al. 2014). Many of these issues
contain as much a functional as a political dimension, as
became obvious in a workshop on future challenges in the
design and use of biodiversity offset schemes (Mann et al.
2014). Decisions for or against certain policy forms and designs
are often linked to fundamental and potentially antagonistic
philosophies and rationalities of how to see, use and value
nature (Mann et al. 2014). One key challenge for the future of
biodiversity policies is to make such decisions more explicit in
order to allow the concerned public to judge and engage with
such policies.
Meeting ambitious policy targets for biodiversity
protection, as they are set in the CBD and the European
Union, requires a critical review of existing and emerging
policy instruments to learn from past experiences and to
improve their design (Paloniemi et al. 2012). This suggests
that an approach is needed that opens up policy design
discourses for a larger set of concerned actors to increase
reflexive debates and learning for policy development. Such
participatory innovation approaches have long been discussed
in the area of technology assessment (Rip et al. 1995; Schot &
Rip 1997; Rip & te Kulve 2008; Robinson 2009). Here, the idea
is to open the process of technological design for consideration
of broader societal concerns, in direct interaction with affected
societal groups. Technologies shall be shaped in the process
of their making, so that, from the outset, they are responding
and adapted to the contexts in which they are expected to
be used. Practically, for conservation trading systems, this
comes down to an involvement of actors from beyond the
instrument constituency networks, who are directly concerned
with the development of conservation trading, as well as
actors who voice a critical perspective on the policy project
(Garud & Ahlstrom 1997). Such actors can be private
landowners, environmental non-governmental organizations,
critics of market-based approaches for nature and biodiversity
protection, and/or proponents of alternative policy solutions
that are able to reintroduce alternative perspectives and
relegate critical issues in the design discourse.
Ideally organized as a continuous process, open fora, which
bring all these actors together, would discuss a range of
future projections of policy instrument developments and
potential impacts. These fora would serve as bridging events
and would aim to create awareness of potential opportunities
and challenges at different stages of policy development,
stimulating coordination and responsiveness between policy-
makers and policy-takers. Instead of waiting for generic policy
designs to enter society, such social policy assessments should
also be implemented on a transnational level (Mann & Voß
2015).
CONCLUSIONS
While issues such as biodiversity loss and sustainable
development provide an important reference for policy
justification, they do not fully explain the emergence and
development of conservation trading systems. As we have
shown in this analysis, the development of conservation
trading as a globally circulating policy blueprint has been
closely related to the growth of an instrument constituency
strategically promoting their preferred instruments in
international policy discourses. In their joint engagement,
actors mutually enrolled each other for the realization of
particular versions and expectations of conservation trading.
The constituency has developed capacities for strategic
collective action in pursuing these interests and thereby turned
into a political actor in its own right.
However, surprisingly little attention has so far been paid
to the influence of instrument constituencies on the policy
process and thus the political dimension of policy instrument
design and choice (Voß & Simons 2014; Simons & Voß 2015).
Where instrument constituencies operate transnationally and
promote the standardization of policy designs, lessening the
significance of crucial design issues and policy alternatives
can cause socioecological and cultural problems after policy
implementation on a large scale. There is a high risk that
diversity and contextual differences are ignored and thus fail
to work (see Mann & Absher 2014). Policymakers and policy
analysts alike should therefore begin to take this constituency
seriously as an influential political actor with a strong interest
in sustaining and further expanding conservation trading.
As the design and use of conservation trading systems
begins to stabilize, it is crucial to keep asking questions as to
the effectiveness and legitimacy of pursued innovations and
how they are shaped. For practical policy and decision-making
implications, we suggest opening up the policy design process
to include actors from outside the boundaries of instrument
constituencies. Debating challenging futures of policy designs,
reflecting and learning from past implementation experiences,
and acknowledging possible shortcomings with a broad
range of concerned societal perspectives can help to inform
policymaking and lead to more robust, or societally-embedded
policy solutions.
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